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Exclusion tasks have been proposed as objective measures of unconscious perception
as they do not depend upon subjective ratings. In exclusion tasks, participants have to
complete a task without using a previously presented prime. Use of the prime is taken
as evidence for unconscious processing in the absence of awareness, yet it may also
simply indicate that participants have weak experiences but fail to realize that these affect
the response or fail to counter the effect on the response. Here, we tested this claim
by allowing participants to rate their experience of a masked prime on the perceptual
awareness scale (PAS) after the exclusion task. Results showed that the prime was used
almost as often when participants reported having seen a “weak glimpse” of the prime
as when they claimed to have “no experience” of the prime, thus suggesting participants
frequently have weak (possibly contentless) experiences of the stimulus when failing to
exclude. This indicates that the criteria for report of awareness is lower (i.e., more liberal)
than that for exclusion and that failure to exclude should not be taken as evidence of
complete absence of awareness.
Keywords: consciousness, exclusion paradigm, perceptual awareness scale, subliminal perception, unconscious
processing
INTRODUCTION
Although it is more than a 100 years since Sidis (1898) used
subjective measures of visual perception, the last decade has
brought about an increased scientiﬁc interest in the topic. The
main question in this line of research is how conscious experience
is optimally measured behaviorally. One popular method is to
examine the relationship between the accuracy with which some
task is performed and indications from a measure of awareness.
The measure of awareness can be relatively direct and openly
subjective – e.g., asking participants to report their conscious expe-
rience (e.g., Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004; Lau and Passingham,
2006; Overgaard et al., 2006; Rounis et al., 2010). However, con-
scious information is typically deﬁned as the information that
can be used for overt behaviour or higher-order cognition, and
some measures utilize this connection. Some measures require
participants to judge their conﬁdence in being correct (a higher-
order decision; e.g., Dienes et al., 1995), and other measures ask
participants to place wagers on the correctness of their reply (a
process presumed to be guided by the information available for
higher-order cognition; e.g., Persaud et al., 2007). Recently, several
studies have been conducted comparing these types of awareness
measures as will be shown below.
When comparing different measures of awareness, researchers
have used several approaches. One popular method is the “sub-
jective threshold” or “dissociation” approach. Here, participants
typically perform a forced-choice detection or discrimination
task and subsequently rate their experience of the stimulus.
Unconscious processing, in this case, is presumed to be responsible
for any above-chance performance found when stimuli are below
the so-called subjective criterion (i.e., when participants claim to
have no experience of the identity of the stimulus; Snodgrass and
Shevrin, 2006).
The ideal subjective measure should detect all relevant con-
scious knowledge (or all experiences; Merikle, 1982; Reingold and
Merikle, 1988, 1990; Merikle and Joordens, 1997). Exhaustiveness,
i.e., the degree to which conscious processing is detected (Reingold
and Merikle, 1988), has been compared between scales in previ-
ous studies. Typically, a scale is considered more exhaustive if it
indicates less unconscious processing by the guessing criterion (as
explained above) and/or more conscious processing by the zero
correlation criterion (a measure of how well awareness ratings
predict task accuracy; Dienes et al., 1995; Sandberg et al., 2010).
Unfortunately, the problems associated with poor exhaustiveness
cannot be solved simply by preferring the scale that shows the
greatest sensitivity as some scales misclassify unconscious infor-
mation as conscious – that is, they are not exclusive (Reingold
and Merikle, 1988). Generally, the solution is to compare scales
for which there is no a priori reason to assume a difference in
exclusiveness.
Using this approach, one study found that post-decision wager-
ing (PDW) was generally inferior to conﬁdence ratings (CR) in
an artiﬁcial grammar paradigm because PDW was affected by
loss aversion (Dienes and Seth, 2009). Another study replicated
this ﬁnding for visual identiﬁcation, but also found that ratings
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on the perceptual awareness scale (PAS) were more exhaustive
than CR (Sandberg et al., 2010). This ﬁnding was replicated in a
very recent study (using a gender identiﬁcation task), but only
when awareness ratings were made after the identiﬁcation task
(the study found that most scales indicated less awareness when
used before the identiﬁcation task; Wierzchon´ et al., 2014). PAS
has also been found to be more exhaustive than dichotomous
ratings of awareness (Overgaard et al., 2006). Based on these stud-
ies and more, we have previously ventured the hypothesis that
the most exhaustive measure may simply be asking participants
directly about their experience (Overgaard et al., 2010; Overgaard
and Sandberg, 2012), and that especially PDW is best used when
participants are unable to use a more direct measure (e.g., in
studies with non-human animals; Sandberg et al., 2013). Gen-
erally, we tentatively propose that whenever participants report
their awareness indirectly, whatever task they perform, it intro-
duces an extra process that might fail, or it requires participants
to be able to link the quality of experience with task performance
ﬂawlessly.
Nevertheless, examining the relationship between task accuracy
and different types of awareness ratings is not the only method for
examining unconscious processing, and it may indeed be claimed
that the core problem of any subjective rating approach is to
rule out weak conscious perception explanations, i.e., that what
appears to be subliminal, in fact, is an effect of weak conscious
perception (c.f. Snodgrass, 2002). One way to avoid subjective rat-
ings altogether is by using so-called exclusion tasks (Jacoby et al.,
1993; Debner and Jacoby, 1994; Jacoby, 1998). Here, participants
are asked to solve an experimental task without using informa-
tion from a brieﬂy presented prime. Participants thus compare
their candidate response with the prime (Jacoby, 1998; Visser and
Merikle, 1999), and the reasoning is that overt exclusion of the
prime is possible as long as it is consciously perceived, but if the
prime (or some aspects of it) were perceived unconsciously, it
inﬂuences performance andproduces above-chance relativematch
frequencies. Although it has recently been argued (Persaud and
McLeod, 2014) that the method fulﬁlls all criteria for an optimal
measure of awareness as proposed by Newell and Shanks (2014), it
is presently an open question howparticipants rate their awareness
when failing to exclude and whether such exclusion approaches
less vulnerable to weak conscious perception explanations than
PAS. It is imperative for the validity of exclusion tasks that no
conscious perception is found when exclusion fails following the
assumptions set up by Merikle and Joordens when explaining the
meaning of exclusion failure:
“The fact that the immediately preceding words were used as responses
despite the instructionsnot touse thewords suggests thatmaskedwords
were perceived without awareness, at least on some proportion of the
trials. This interpretation follows from two critical assumptions. First,
conscious perception of the immediately preceding word leads subjects
not to use it to complete the stem. [. . .] Second, responses are controlled
by conscious inﬂuences whenever either conscious inﬂuences alone or
both conscious and unconscious inﬂuences are present”
(Merikle and Joordens, 1997, p. 113).
It is thus stated that conscious perception takes priority so that
whenever conscious perception is present, participants exclude
successfully, and exclusion failure is thus an indicator of the
(complete) absence of awareness. However, if consciousness is
graded or continuous, some potential problems occur, namely the
problem of the presence of weak conscious perception. In this
context, it has been claimed that exclusion tasks share the poten-
tial problems of subjective threshold approaches (Snodgrass, 2002;
Snodgrass and Shevrin, 2006). The criticism has been formulated
from a single-process signal detection theory perspective, but one
does not need to accept this view in order to consider or accept
the criticism. The main argument behind the criticism is that sen-
sory evidence in general is continuous, and the participant will
only exclude the candidate word on a given trial if the evidence
exceeds a certain threshold. This necessitates that a criterion is
set for when to exclude, and from the single-process signal detec-
tion theory perspective there is no guarantee that this criterion
reﬂects anything but a decision with its own criterion. From a
less radical perspective, it may simply be argued that the crite-
rion for exclusion is not necessarily the most exhaustive, and it
may indeed be possible that participants weak experiences before
they exclude, just as they report weak experiences on the PAS
before they report them on a dichotomous scale or before they
report any conﬁdence in being correct (Overgaard et al., 2006;
Sandberg et al., 2010). This is an empirical question, and examin-
ing whether participants have weak experiences when they fail to
exclude (thus rejecting the second premise of Merikle and Joor-
dens) is possible. This is related to the exhaustiveness of exclusion
tasks.
In this context, it should be emphasized that there are several
aspects to exhaustiveness. One aspect that we have highlighted
above is whether exclusion failure is vulnerable to the weak con-
scious perception criticism, i.e., whether participants report weak
experiences when they fail to exclude, and this aspect is critical for
the validity of theuse of exclusion tasks in isolation. Another aspect
is the general level of metacognition indicated by each measure –
i.e., whether awareness ratings or exclusion performance indicate
the most unconscious processing. This last question is difﬁcult to
answer without using the process dissociation procedure (PDP)
to estimate unconscious processing based on both inclusion and
exclusion task performance, and this aspect is thus beyond the goal
of the present study. The goal here is to examine whether exclusion
failure should be accepted as evidence for the complete absence of
awareness.
In the present study, we speciﬁcally examined the relationship
between exclusion failure and awareness ratings by asking partic-
ipants to perform an exclusion task and subsequently rate their
awareness of the prime using the PAS. We hypothesized that if
exclusion requires less sensory evidence than reporting weak expe-
riences, above-chance failure to exclude should be observed only
for the lowest awareness rating, and awareness ratings are thus
likely to be affected to the weak conscious perception criticism
(i.e., participants are unwilling/unable to report weak experience
that they nevertheless use to guide overt behavior). If, however,
above-chance failure to exclude is also observed when participants
report some awareness of the prime, participants require less sen-
sory evidence to report weak experiences than to exclude (and the
weak perception criticism thus applies to the exclusion task). This
would mean that exclusion failure should not be taken as evidence
for the complete absence of conscious perception and that the
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second assumption put forward by Merikle and Joordens (1997)
is not true. The result would also generally support the claim that
failure to exclude is sometimes a matter of not trusting weak per-
ception enough to use it to exclude or that the weak perception is
so poor that it simply cannot be used (we will return to this issue
in the Discussion).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Sixteen healthy participants (nine females) with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision gave informed consent to participate
in the experiment. The mean age was 24.9 years (SD = 1.67).
The local ethics committee, De Videnskabsetiske Komitéer for
Region Midtjylland, provided written conﬁrmation that no ethi-
cal approval was required for the study according to Danish law,
speciﬁcally Komitéloven §7 and §8.1.
APPARATUS AND STIMULI
Stimuli were generated and displayed in Spyder 2.1.111 using
Python 2.6.62 and PsychoPy v.1.74.013. They were displayed on
a 14′′ LED monitor with a screen resolution of 1366 × 768 at a
refresh rate of 60 Hz. Stimuli consisted of 308 four to six letter
Danish words, and masks were rows of six pseudorandom letters.
Words were found using a Danish frequency dictionary, and it
was conﬁrmed that at least two four to six letter words could be
constructed using the ﬁrst three letters of any individual target
word.
PROCEDURE
Participants performed an exclusion task in which they were asked
to complete a three letter word stem without using a brieﬂy dis-
played primed word (Figure 1). The three letter word stem was
always identical to the ﬁrst three letters of the primed word. At
the onset of each trial, a ﬁxation mark appeared for 500 ms.
The ﬁxation mark was followed by a forward mask consisting of
six pseudorandom letters displayed for 50 ms. Next followed the
prime word with a duration pseudorandomly selected between
11 possibilities between 0 and 200 ms with no possibilities in the
interval between 150 and 200 ms: {0, 16.7,..., 133.3, 150, 200}.
For prime durations of 0 ms, no prime was presented. The prime
was followed by a backward mask consisting of six pseudorandom
letters displayed for 50 ms. A word stem consisting of the ﬁrst
three letters of the target word followed the backward mask and
remained on screen until participants had completed the word
stem or until 10 s had passed. Finally, a graphical representation of
the PAS (Table 1) appeared on screen, and participants were asked
to indicate their experience of the prime word using the keyboard
number keys. The response options were: “1: No experience”(NE),
“2: Weak glimpse” (WG), “3: An almost clear experience” (ACE),
and “4: A clear experience” (CE). It is important to note that
PAS is not simply a “labeled four-point scale” (Sandberg et al.,
2013). In some publications using PAS, scale points are discussed
as PAS1–PAS4 (e.g., Overgaard et al., 2006; Timmermans et al.,
1http://code.google.com/p/spyderlib
2http://www.python.org
3http://www.psychopy.org
FIGURE 1 | Experimental paradigm. A forward and backward masked
prime lasting between 0 and 200 ms was presented on each trial.
Following prime presentation, a three letter word stem appeared on screen
and participants had to complete the word stem with any word except the
prime. In the example shown here, participants should avoid writing
“MARKET,” but could write “MARCH” or “MARS” for instance. After this,
participants reported their awareness of the prime using the perceptual
awareness scale (PAS).
Table 1 |The perceptual awareness scale (PAS).
Label Description (from Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004)
(1) No experience No impression of the stimulus. All answers are
seen as mere guesses
(2) A weak
experience
A feeling that something has been shown. Not
characterised by any content, and this cannot be
speciﬁed any further
(3) An almost clear
experience
Ambiguous experience of the stimulus. Some
stimulus aspects are experienced more vividly than
others. A feeling of almost being certain about
one’s answer
(4) A clear
experience
Non-ambiguous experience of the stimulus. No
doubt in one’s answer
Scale steps and descriptions.
2010), whereas in others, they are discussed as the category labels
NE, WG, ACE, CE (e.g., in Overgaard et al., 2008, 2013). Whereas
this is just a matter of wording, the latter indicates more directly
that PAS crucially depends on the deﬁnition of the four categories.
Thus, participants were instructed that NE should be used when
there is no experience at all, not even a faint sensation. WG should
be used when there is a very weak/vague visual experience without
any ability to specify what was perceived. ACE should be is used
when there is an experience of what was perceived, yet unclear or
blurry. CE should be used when there is a clear experience of what
is perceived.
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The experiment consisted of a practice block and six
experimental blocks. For all blocks (including practice), each of
the 11 prime durations was used four times in a pseudorandom
order, resulting in a total of 44 trials per block. The experiment
consisted of 308 trials in total for each participant.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The relationship between awareness ratings and matches of
primed and reported words in the exclusion task was analyzed
using logistic regression. Match (1 if the prime word was reported
within the allotted time-period of 10 s and 0 otherwise) was
considered as the dependent variable and awareness rating and
stimulus duration along with the interaction between the two
as independent variables. A random participant effect was also
included in the analysis. Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests were used
to assess systematic differences. Data were analysed using Stata
version 12.1.
RESULTS
First, the relationship between objective clarity (stimulus dura-
tion) and subjective clarity (PAS rating) was examined in order
to conﬁrm that different PAS ratings reﬂected different conscious
experiences. As seen in Figure 2, mean PAS rating as a function of
stimulus duration appeared to have a sigmoidal shape as observed
in previous PAS experiments (Sandberg et al., 2011). Furthermore,
all PAS ratingswere used across awide range of stimulus durations,
but for PAS1 (NE), themodewas 0ms, for PAS2 (WG) itwas 33ms,
for PAS3 (ACE) it was 83 ms, and for PAS4 (CE) it was 200 ms. In
other words, when the stimulus became physically clearer, higher
PAS ratings were used more frequently, thus indicating that par-
ticipants used higher PAS ratings to report clearer experiences as
instructed.
Next, relative match frequency was plotted for each aware-
ness rating and overall without taking awareness rating into
account as a function of stimulus duration (Figure 3). In gen-
eral, above-chance relative match frequencies were observed for
PAS1 (NE) and PAS2 (WG; χ2(10) > 98 and p < 0.0001 in
both cases) whereas below-chance relative match frequencies
were observed for PAS3 (ACE) and PAS4 (CE; χ2(10) > 230
and p < 0.0001 in both cases), with chance deﬁned as the
group-level relative match frequency for t = 0 ms (12.0%). Sig-
niﬁcant above-chance relative match frequencies at the p < 0.05
level were observed for PAS1 (NE) for all stimulus durations
except 17 ms (p < 0.001 for all of these except 117 ms). For
PAS2 (WG), signiﬁcant above-chance match were observed for
all stimulus durations in the interval 50–133 ms (p < 0.005
for 50, 67, and 100 ms). For PAS3 (ACE), signiﬁcant below-
chance relative match frequencies were observed at 17, 100, and
133–150 ms (p < 0.005 for 100 ms). For PAS4 (CE), signiﬁcant
below-chance relative match frequencies were observed in the
FIGURE 2 | Response distribution. (A) Mean PAS as a function of stimulus duration. (B–E) Response distribution as a function of stimulus duration and PAS
rating Note that each PAS rating was used across a wide range of stimulus durations and that the mode of each rating was increasing with increasing reported
clarity of experience (PAS rating).
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FIGURE 3 | Exclusion performance. (Top) Match frequency (the frequency
with which the prime was used to complete the word stem) with 95%-CI
from the logistic regression model is plotted as a function of stimulus
duration for each PAS rating PAS1 (no experience), PAS2 (a vague
experience), PAS3 (an almost clear experience), and PAS4 (a clear
experience). At “0 ms”, no prime was presented and match frequency here
thus reﬂects the probability of coincidentally selecting the same word as the
computer. Note that after around 33 ms, match frequency increases for
PAS1-2 and decreases for PAS3-4, indicating that participants fail to exclude
both when they report not having seen the prime at all, but also when they
had a vague experience of it. (Bottom) Overall match frequency as a function
of stimulus duration without taking into account PAS rating.
67–200 ms interval (p < 0.005 for all of these, except 67
and 133 ms).
Finally, relative match frequency was compared between PAS
ratings. A small difference was observed in relative match fre-
quency between PAS1 (NE) and PAS2 (WG; LR = 21.0∼χ2(11),
p = 0.033, uncorrected for multiple comparisons). The difference
was thus numerically small and not signiﬁcant if corrections for
six comparisons (between all PAS ratings) were made. However,
relative match frequencies for both PAS1 (NE) and PAS2 (WG)
were statistically signiﬁcantly higher than for PAS3 (ACE) and
PAS4 (CE), and relative match frequencies for PAS4 (CE) were
signiﬁcantly lower than for PAS3 (ACE; LR > 141.4∼χ2(11) and
p < 0.0001 for all comparisons).
DISCUSSION
Overall, the results indicated that the criterion for reporting weak
experiences was more liberal than the criterion for exclusion,
and it is thus unlikely that exclusion tasks are less vulnerable
to weak experience critiques than ratings on the PAS. Crucially,
this means that exclusion failure should not be taken as evi-
dence of the complete absence of awareness, thus indicating
that the second assumption for the validity of exclusion tasks
(Merikle and Joordens, 1997) is not true. Speciﬁcally, we found
that failure to exclude a primed word from report was observed
almost to the same extent when participants reported that they
had “no experience” of the prime (PAS1) as when they had “a
vague experience” or perceived “a weak glimpse” (PAS2), but
not when they had “an almost clear experience” (PAS3) or “a
clear experience” (PAS4). In other words, participants failed to
exclude the prime not only when they claimed to see nothing
at all, but also when they had a weak experience of the target.
One interpretation is that participants use only highly reliable
information to guide overt behavior, yet they are nevertheless con-
sistently able to distinguish weak experiences from the absence of
experience.
It appears highly unlikely that the results were caused by PAS
ratings being used randomly (i.e., that reports of awareness were
unreliable) as it was conﬁrmed that participants used PAS simi-
larly to how it has been used in previous studies, i.e., when the
stimulus was physically clearer, higher PAS ratings were used more
frequently, thus indicating that participants used higher PAS rat-
ings to report clearer experiences as instructed. These results are
consistent with previous observations that PAS ratings do not
only increase as a function of physical clarity, but also that each
PAS rating is associated with a different accuracy level in stimulus
identiﬁcation (i.e., inclusion) tasks, again indicating that PAS rat-
ings reﬂect different experiences (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004;
Sandberg et al., 2010).
For these reasons, it appears more likely that the results were
caused by participants being unwilling or unable to let weak
(and potentially unreliable) experiences guide exclusion, or that
they saw no reason to exclude the ﬁrst word that came to mind
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because they were unaware that weak experiences inﬂuenced word
generation. There are thus at least three interpretations of the
results: (1) Participants could have had information that they
chose not to use because they did not want to risk indicating
conﬁdence in something they were very uncertain about. (2) Par-
ticipants were unable to use the information that they had. (3)
Participants saw no reason to use the information they had as they
were unaware that it was reliable.
The ﬁrst interpretation could be hypothesized as part of the
explanation for PAS has fared better than CR in some experiments
as participants might fear looking over-conﬁdent if they report
any conﬁdence in cases where they only have a hunch, but the
explanation is not very likely as CR are generally not affected by
risk aversion (Dienes and Seth, 2009), and it thus seems unlikely
that exclusion tasks should suffer from this. Additionally, in an
exclusion task the conservative, risk-averse action might be to
exclude even when there is only low conﬁdence in order to avoid
reporting something incorrect. This leaves the explanations of
inability to use information or simply not using it because it seems
irrelevant.
The deﬁnition of PAS2 ratings as reﬂecting subjective detec-
tion (but not identiﬁcation) of a stimulus is relevant to both
these interpretations. Speciﬁcally, if participants use PAS2 as
instructed, they will use it to report that something was pre-
sented, but that they do not know what was presented (Ramsøy
and Overgaard, 2004). Based on the current experiment, it is nev-
ertheless not possible to distinguish the two interpretations, and
we simply conclude that exclusion is typically not performed for
weak, possibly contentless experiences. This means that exclu-
sion tasks are unlikely to be a solution to any alternative weak
conscious perception accounts that could be used to criticize
ﬁndings of unconscious perception using the subjective thresh-
old approach with PAS as the criterion for using PAS2 is already
very liberal, and more so than for exclusion. Nevertheless, we
emphasize that the results of the present experiment should be
interpreted with caution as all aspects of exhaustiveness have not
been examined. Speciﬁcally, it has not been examined if anal-
yses based on PAS ratings indicate less unconscious processing
across stimulus durations than the PDP. This comparison is non-
trivial and would necessitate that inclusion task performance is
also obtained.
Some alternative interpretations should also be discussed. One
interpretation of the use of PAS2 ratings – slightly different from
the “detection” interpretation – has been proposed by Dienes and
Seth (2010). They argue that a given stimulus feature is either per-
ceived or not, and that PAS2 ratings reﬂect ratings of perceived,
but irrelevant, stimulus features. When these irrelevant features
are seen, the probability of seeing a relevant feature unconsciously
may nevertheless be higher than when nothing is perceived at all,
and instead of PAS being more exhaustive than, for instance, CR,
it is in fact less exclusive and misclassiﬁes some unconscious infor-
mation as conscious. This interpretationwould also hypothetically
account for the ﬁndings of the present experiment if PAS2 ratings
simply reﬂect reports about irrelevant information, and that deci-
sions to exclude are based only on all-or-none information about
relevant stimulus features. However, the explanation has difﬁculty
accounting for some other observations.
First, if conscious experience were indeed dichotomous, it is
difﬁcult to explain why participants consistently claim to per-
ceive images at different levels of clarity, and why different levels
of awareness are associated with different levels of task accu-
racy in identiﬁcation tasks. A graded/partial awareness perspective
(Kouider et al., 2010) can account for this to some extent, but we
do not ﬁnd it convincing in all cases. Graded perception of com-
plex objects is easy to imagine, but it is more difﬁcult when very
simple objects, such as line segments only differing in orienta-
tion, are used. Here, any graded perception of even a single pixel
should be diagnostic and result in peak accuracy, yet this is not
observed – accuracy increases slowly as a function of awareness
(Overgaard et al., 2006).
Second, if CR (or exclusion decisions) exclusively reﬂects per-
ception of relevant features whereas PAS reﬂects perception of
both relevant and irrelevant features, it should be expected that
whenever ratings of full conﬁdence are given, accuracy should be
around peak level and at least as high as for PAS4 ratings (as the
participants indicate complete awareness of the relevant features).
However, a previous study found that at low stimulus intensities
accuracy for PAS4 ratings was very high (almost at 100%) whereas
it was relatively poor for CR4 ratings (around 75%, with chance
at 25%; Sandberg et al., 2010). The better accuracy-awareness cor-
relation for PAS than for CR is thus not present only for low
ratings where weak experiences could lead to subliminal percep-
tion. This ﬁnding can be explained byCR4 having a lower criterion
than PAS4 with all evidence being treated equally, or alternatively
that participants are generally worse at using CR [e.g., these rat-
ings reﬂect a different kind of knowledge (Timmermans et al.,
2010)], but PAS ratings reﬂecting irrelevant information does not
explain why participants are not accurate when reporting peak
conﬁdence.
These two issues argue against the interpretation that PAS2 rat-
ings simply reﬂect irrelevant information, and in the context of
the present experiment, we thus believe that the evidence weighs
in favor of our original accounts. However, even if the alter-
native account should be true, it does not make PAS use less
relevant as participants can generally distinguish these cases of
weak (or subliminal) perception from cases of no experience,
thus leaving it for the scientist to decide how to treat them in
the analyses.
One explanation for a lower criterion for awareness ratings
than for exclusion is related to a very recent study (Wierzchon´
et al., 2014), which demonstrated that if visual identiﬁcation is
performed before an awareness rating is given, then a higher level
of metacognition (i.e., a better relationship between awareness
rating and accuracy) is found than when the awareness rating
is given before the visual identiﬁcation task. This may be taken
as evidence that performing the visual identiﬁcation increases
metacognition, although it cannot be ruled out entirely that
the effect would not be found when simply increasing the time
between stimulus presentation and awareness report or when
inserting any (i.e., even an unrelated) task. In any case, it could
mean that part of the willingness/ability to report weak experi-
ences while failing the exclusion task in the present experiment
was caused by the effect of increased metacognition at the time of
the awareness report. We do not interpret this as a confound in
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our study, but rather a potential explanation, as both awareness
ratings and the exclusion task were used as they are typically
used in the literature; i.e., exclusion tasks are never preceded
by awareness ratings, but awareness ratings are almost always
preceded by some kind of ﬁrst order detection or identiﬁcation
task.
In summary, we conclude that participants consistently and
reliably report weak experiences when they fail to exclude, thus
demonstrating that the second assumption necessary for the valid-
ity of exclusion task is not true (the assumption being that
whenever there is any conscious perception, even if there is also
unconscious perception, participants will exclude). This means
that the criterion for reporting weak experiences is more liberal
than the criterion for exclusion, and in addition, it is thus unlikely
that exclusion tasks are less vulnerable to weak conscious percep-
tion explanations than awareness ratings. For these reasons, we
argue that there is no evidence in favour of using other meth-
ods for acquiring information about participants’ experience than
allowing them to report it directly – whenever the state of the
participants and the experimental context allow for it – and that
exclusion failure should not be taken as evidence of absence of
awareness. It is more likely to reﬂect the absence of a certain
strength of conscious perception necessary for that perception to
be used to guide overt behavior, not a complete absence of aware-
ness. Nevertheless, we emphasize that the present study has not
conducted a direct comparison of all aspects of exhaustiveness for
awareness ratings and the PDP as a whole. The conclusions thus
concern weak experience accounts and the interpretation of exclu-
sion failure, and we encourage direct comparisons of awareness
ratings and PDP in future studies.
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